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Şifre Kasam.

An encrypted vault that stays on your device.

An offline, multi-user password manager built with Flutter.

Role
Mobile development
Scope
Solo project
Year
2026
9:41

Unlock your vault

Enter your master password to continue.

Master password
9:41

Vault

Your accounts, safely stored.

⌕  Search accounts…
AllPersonalWork
Google••••••••
GitHub••••••••
LinkedIn••••••••
Email••••••••
Bank••••••••
♙
Vault
▦
Categories
⚙
Settings
Illustrative interface · Sample data

Cloudless. Per-user. Encrypted.

Each user has a separate local vault. A key derived from the master password encrypts and decrypts records on the device.

Master password
Argon2id
Vault key
AES-256-GCM
SQLite

Random salt per user and a fresh nonce for every write. Argon2id: 19 MiB, 2 passes.

My contribution.

I built the Flutter app, encryption layer and migration that securely encrypts old plaintext records.

Neither the password nor its hash is stored. Login is verified by decrypting a fixed encrypted marker.

Technical validation

Tests that matter.

Encryption round trip

Nonce randomness

Wrong-password rejection

Tamper detection

Key-derivation cost

Being transparent

Known limitations.

Key in process memory, outside the OS keystore.
Clipboard is not cleared automatically.
Screenshots are not blocked.
No auto-lock in the background.
What I learned

“A key’s strength comes from the password’s entropy.”

I replaced the four-digit PIN with a master password. My measured Argon2id derivation cost was ~220 ms: all 10,000 PINs could be tried in about 37 minutes.

Tech stack.

  • Flutter
  • Dart
  • SQLite
  • Argon2id
  • AES-256-GCM
Technical notes and project scope

The problem and my role

Most password managers are cloud-based. I wanted a vault that stays on one device, needs no internet connection and supports several people sharing the same phone.

A solo project, entirely mine.

Implementation decisions

  • The vault key is derived from the master password with Argon2id (19 MiB, 2 passes). Every user gets their own random salt, so two people with the same password never share a key.
  • Records are encrypted with AES-256-GCM. A fresh nonce per write means even the fact that two accounts share a password does not leak.
  • The password is never stored, and neither is a hash of it: login works by checking whether a fixed marker encrypted under the key can be decrypted.
  • For records coming from the old plain-text version I wrote a migration that runs in a single transaction — nothing is lost.

Outcome and learning

The vault is encrypted now, and the crypto layer is covered by tests: round-trip, nonce randomness, wrong-password rejection, tamper detection and a measurement of key-derivation cost. The app is still fully offline.

The real lesson came from an unexpected place. The app used a 4-digit PIN, and deriving the key from it would have made the encryption theatre. I measured it on my own machine: one Argon2id derivation takes ~220 ms, so all 10,000 possibilities fall in 37 minutes. A key’s strength comes from the password’s entropy, not from the KDF — the KDF only supplies the multiplier. I dropped the PIN for a master password and left a test that fails if that measured cost ever regresses.

Encryption is in, but that is not the whole security surface. The vault key lives only in process memory, not in the OS keystore. A copied password stays on the clipboard indefinitely, screenshots are not blocked, and the vault does not auto-lock when the app goes to the background. All of it is listed in the README.